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‘Even children lisp the rights of man’:  International Human Rights Law and 
National Minority Jurisdictions 
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter was prompted by a political fallout between the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom (UKSC) and the Scottish Government shortly after the UKSC began 
first hearing cases in 2009.  It involved an attack by the Scottish government on the 
London-based court for meddling in domestic Scottish affairs, notably Scottish 
criminal law, on the grounds that certain aspects of Scottish criminal procedure 
violated the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and were therefore 
beyond the competence of the Scottish government.  Whereas there are many possible 
readings of the political motivation of the Scottish Government in this particular spat, 
the incident raises an interesting issue for international human rights law. Taking the 
Scottish government’s protestations in good faith, this chapter explores whether the 
position of the Scottish Government can be normatively justified and defended in the 
practice of human rights law. Emphasising the fact that all human rights norms 
require some form of ‘domestication’ in their application within national legal 
systems, it provides a sketch of a normative argument for autonomy in the 
‘domestication’ of international human rights norms in national minority institutional 
structures by drawing upon liberal theories of minority rights and theories of 
constitutional patriotism.  It then assesses whether the autonomy of national 
minorities in the implementation of international human rights norms can be 
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accommodated in the extant doctrinal and structural resources of the practice of 
international human rights law.   
 
2. Nonsense in a Kilt?:1 The Politics of Human Rights Protection 
Since the foundation of the Union between Scotland and England in 1707, the highest 
court of appeal in the state, the House of Lords (sitting as the Privy Council), has had 
jurisdiction to hear Scottish civil but not criminal appeals.  Whereas there has 
traditionally been an avenue of appeal to the House of Lords from the Scottish courts 
in civil matters, criminal cases stopped at the highest court of criminal appeal in 
Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary (HCJ) in Edinburgh, and there was no way of 
appealing the decision of that court to London.   
The Scotland Act (SA) which established the Scottish Parliament and 
Government simultaneously restricted their powers by nullifying any act of either 
body which was beyond the competences bestowed upon them by the Act itself.2  The 
Privy Council and subsequently the UKSC, had jurisdiction to definitively determine 
whether either body acted outside of its competences under the SA.3  In order to 
ensure the uniform protection of rights across the UK, the SA provided that any act of 
the Scottish Parliament or Government which breached the HRA was automatically 
outwith the competence of the Parliament or Government.4  
In Scottish criminal procedure, moreover, the Lord Advocate is the head of the 
prosecution service, and all criminal prosecutions in Scotland take place in their 
name.  However, the Lord Advocate is also an ex officio member of the Scottish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This title is borrowed from C. Himsworth, ‘Rights versus Devolution’ in T. Campbell, K. Ewing and 
A. Tomkins, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, 2001). 
2 S. 29, 54 & 57 SA. 
3 Sch. 6 SA. 
4 s. 29(2)(d) SA. 
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Government.5  Therefore all criminal prosecutions, by dint of being brought, formally 
speaking, by the Lord Advocate, are therefore acts of the Scottish Government and 
can therefore be challenged before the UKSC on competence grounds which includes 
the question of whether the conduct of the trial was in conformity with the ECHR, 
and the right to a fair trial in Art. 6 in particular. The upshot of the combined effects 
of the SA & HRA, therefore, was to allow the London court to hear criminal appeals 
in the guise competences challenges for alleged breaches of human rights; something 
which was unprecedented in the Scottish criminal procedural system since the 
foundation of the Union in 1707.6 
 Against this background, then, in a brief period of seven months between 2010 
and 2011, the newly established UKSC7 made two important rulings involving human 
rights and Scottish criminal law; Cadder v. HMA8 and Frazer v. HMA.9  The Cadder 
decision involved a challenge to the practice of police questioning of suspects who 
were ‘detained’ rather than ‘arrested’ without recourse to legal advice. 10   The 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, allowed arrestees to have access to legal 
advice prior to police interrogation but did not afford the same guarantee to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 s. 44(1)(c) SA. 
6 The system has now been amended by ss. 36(6) and 34(3) of the Scotland Act 2012 which tightens up 
the rules on when the UKSC can consider ‘compatibility issues’, including the alleged breach of human 
rights in criminal trials in Scotland.  Under this revised procedure, the UKSC can only determine the 
compatibility of a criminal prosecution with the HRA before remitting the case back to the HCJ for the 
case to be concluded.  Therefore, future potential breaches of human rights in criminal cases in 
Scotland no longer result in the proceedings being a nullity, but will rather result in an order of the HCJ 
if the UKSC confirms that a breach has occurred.  
7 The UK Supreme Court was established by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 replacing the House 
of Lords and Privy Council and started work on 1 September 2009. 
8 [2010] UKSC 43. 
9 [2011] UKSC 24. 
10 Scottish criminal procedure has for several decades recognized a form of legal custody short of arrest 
known as ‘detention’.  Ostensibly, detainees, unlike arrestees, are under ‘no legal compulsion’ to go 
along with the request of police officers (Swankie v. Milne 1973 S. L. T. 128), however the precise 
difference between the two categories has never been entirely clear (see K. Ewing & K. Dale-Risk, 
Human Rights in Scotland:  Text, Cases and Materials, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 120).  One salient 
difference between the two categories was the fact that the legal protections for arrestees were stronger 
than those of detainees in that they had a right of access to legal advice on their arrest, something 
which was not available to detainees under the old ss. 15 & 17 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995.  This situation which has now changed in the light of the Cadder decision. (see s. 15A Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 providing for right to legal advice for detainees). 
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detainee.11  The practice had been challenged on a number of occasions after the 
passing of the HRA,12 however in Salduz v. Turkey13 in 2008, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the relevant provision of the convention, Art. 6 on 
the right to fair trial, required that those interviewed by the police should normally 
have access to legal advice prior to the commencement of police questioning 
regardless of the legal classification of their detention.14  In the light of this significant 
ruling from Strasbourg, the practice of depriving legal advice to detainees was again 
challenged in Scotland in HMA v. McLean 2010,15 where a full bench of the HCJ in 
Edinburgh found, notwithstanding the ECtHR’s ruling two years previously, that the 
practice was still compatible with Art. 6 ECHR based on the fact that Scottish 
criminal procedure offered alternative guarantees to detainees.  A challenge was taken 
shortly thereafter to the UKSC and in a unanimous decision and using particularly 
reproving language,16  the Court overruled the decision of the full bench of the HCJ 
on the issue, finding that the practice of allowing police questioning of suspects to 
take place without access to legal advice in Scotland was a clear breach of Art. 6 in 
the light of the Salduz decision, and was therefore incompatible with the HRA and 
therefore that criminal trials which introduced evidence from detainees without legal 
advice were outwith the competence of the Lord Advocate and therefore a nullity.  
The second decision, Frazer v. HMA, involved the quashing of a high-profile 
murder conviction based on the fact that significant evidence had been withheld 
during the trial.  The defendant had been found guilty of murdering his wife in 2003 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ss. 15 & 17 CP(S)A 1995. 
12 Paton v. Richie 2000 SLT 239, Dickson v. HMA 2001 JC 203. 
13 Salduz v. Turkey 36391/02 [2008] ECHR 1542. 
14 Ibid. 
15 2010 SLT 73. 
16 For example, Lord Hope giving the leading judgment (and one of the two Scottish justices on the 
court) stated that ‘It was remarkable that, until quite recently, nobody though that there was anything 
wrong with this procedure [of denying legal advice to detainees]’, para. 4 
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and appealed his conviction.  During the appeal, it emerged that a significant piece of 
evidence had been excluded from the trial involving the witness statements of two 
police officers involved in investigating the murder.  The HCJ was, however, satisfied 
that there was enough evidence for conviction even in the absence of the withheld 
evidence.17  Again, the decision of the highest court of criminal appeal in Scotland 
was circumvented when the UKSC accepted jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s 
allegation that the trial breached his fundamental rights. Looking at the substance of 
the case the Court found that the evidence that was withheld ‘had such an obvious 
bearing on a crucial part of the circumstantial case’18 against the defendant such that 
the failure of the prosecution to give the evidence to the defence was a breach of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR and, to much consternation in 
Scotland given the widespread media and public interest in the case, remanded the 
case to the Scottish Courts again to retry the case or quash the conviction. 
The combined effect of these two rulings from the London-based Court caused 
a political storm in Scotland where the ruling Party in the Scottish Parliament, the 
Scottish National Party, unleashed a series of attacks on the Supreme Court for 
meddling in domestic Scottish affairs. Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill railed 
against the ‘ambulance-chasing’19 Supreme Court, claiming that Scotland’s distinct 
legal system had served the country well for hundreds of years ‘ensuring justice for 
victims while also protecting the rights of those accused of crime’20 and darkly hinted 
that such rulings may result in the Scottish government cutting its share of funding for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 [2008] HCJAC 26, 2008 SCCR 407. 
18 Lord Hope, para. 2. 
19 ‘MacAskill threat to end Supreme Court funding’, Herald Scotland, 1 June 2011. 
20 ‘Scottish government moves against UK Supreme Court’ 29 May 2011, BBCNews online. 
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the UKSC.  The core of his ire, was revealed in his comments in one particular 
interview where he stated that:21 
‘We just want to be treated the same as other legal systems – we’re not, because we’re 
undermined routinely by a court that sits in another country and is presided over by a 
majority of judges who have no knowledge of Scots law, never mind Scotland …. [on 
the issue of the protection of human rights] We’ll do so through our own courts at our 
own pace in our own way, not have it imposed by a court in London that is made up 
of a majority of judges who do not know Scots Law, who may have visited here for 
the Edinburgh Festival.’ 
The First Minister Alex Salmond attacked both the Court as well as lawyers who 
were taking human rights cases before it.  As with the Justice Secretary, the basic 
issue for Salmond was that ‘Scotland has, for hundreds of years, been a distinct 
criminal jurisdiction, and the High Court of Justiciary should be the final arbiter of 
criminal cases in Scotland.’22  Salmond claimed that Scotland didn’t need a supreme 
court which ‘by definition’23 comprised of judges ‘whose familiarity with Scottish 
legal procedures is inexact at best’24, and were ‘poking [their] nose’25 in Scottish 
criminal matters.  No other country, in Europe, according to Salmond, had ‘two 
‘foreign’ appeal courts’26 overseeing its legal system.   
Whereas it is true that there was a heavily strategic dimension to these attacks – 
the primary political goal of the SNP government, the holding of a referendum on 
Scottish independence eventually held in September 2014, was at the time of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 ‘MacAskill in new attack on Supreme Court rulings’, Herald Scotland, 31 May 2011. Emphasis 
Added. 
22 ‘Supreme Court threat to Scots Law’ The Scotsman, 26 May 2011. 
23 ‘MacAskill in new attack on Supreme court rulings.’, Herald Scotland, 31 May 2011. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 ‘Alex Salmond provokes fury with attack on UK Supreme court’, The Guardian, 1 June 2011.  
Emphasis Added. 
	   7	  
decisions, far from a certainty - the debacle does raise an interesting issue for 
international human rights law.  The issue was directly posed by the intervention of 
the Advocate General for Scotland in the controversy when he asked ‘Why should 
Scots not have their human rights protected in the same way as people in the rest of 
the UK?’27   
This chapter is an attempt to probe this question by exploring whether the 
theory and practice of human rights law can support the claims of the Justice 
Secretary and First Minister.  In doing so, it is important, at the outset, to distinguish 
the aims of this chapter from other areas of human rights law and practice involving 
national minorities.  In particular this chapter is not, or at least not directly, a 
contribution to debates about the right to self-determination of national minorities nor 
a contribution to the field of the human rights of indigenous peoples.28  Nor is it an 
attempt to explore the liability of states under international human rights law for sub 
state entities or regions over which they have some influence or ‘effective control’.29  
Rather, the issue raised by these events relate to a distinct question in international 
human rights law; that is whether national minorities can or should have some 
discretion, or be afforded a certain margin of appreciation, in the giving effect to 
international human rights norms vis-à-vis the metropole.  
 
3. Human Rights and the Constitutional Identity of National Minorities 
On some levels the political controversy sparked by the UKSC’s rulings seems 
like a rather odd dispute.  Aside from the problematic logic of the Justice Secretary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 ‘Alex Salmond provokes fury with attack on UK Supreme Court’ The Guardian, 1 June 2011. 
28 See generally, D. Thurer and T. Burri, ‘Self-Determination’ in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, (OUP, 2008).   
29 See for example, the Cases of Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-
183, ECHR 2004-VII and Catan v. Moldova and Russia, App. Nos, 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, 
Judgment of 19 October 2012. 
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and First Ministers’ statements regarding  ‘foreign judges’ with no knowledge of 
Scots law – the two leading opinions in Cadder and Frazer were given by Scottish 
judges  -  and the patent lack of more qualified judges (at least from the perspective of 
familiarity and expertise in Scots law) in Strasbourg, the subject matter of the dispute, 
human rights, is one which is usually considered to transcend boundaries, whether 
subnational or national, applying equally to all individuals, regardless of their 
nationality or political status.30  The ‘borderless’ dimension of human rights is 
explicitly recognised by Article 2(2) of the cornerstone of the ‘international Bill of 
rights’, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that, in the 
protection of the rights contained in the declaration, ‘no distinction shall be made on 
the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country of 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.’  Therefore to claim some sort 
of special pleading, or particularity, in the application of international human rights 
standards such as those contained in the ECHR, for one corner of a Western liberal 
democracy seems to question that corner’s commitments to Western liberal 
democracy and contradict the fundamentally universal character of international 
human rights law.   
Thus, at first blush it would seem that the Advocate General’s question, as to 
why Scots should have their human rights protected differently from other UK 
citizens, should be answered in the negative; that there is no reason, given the 
universality of human rights norms, that Scots should have their human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See for example Articles 1 & 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Article 1 states that 
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.  Article 2, ‘Everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.’ 
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protected any differently than anyone else in the UK or indeed Europe, or the world.  
However, viewing the question from the other perspective, that of the global level, 
reveals that things may not be so straightforward.   Universal human rights norms 
necessarily entail a particular dimension whereby the universal and open-textured 
provisions of international human rights law require some ‘contextualization’ within 
different regional and political settings. This particularistic dimension of international 
or regional human rights norms does not, or at least not only, relate to the trivial point 
that all norms need to be applied to particular facts, such that all human rights norms 
have to be particularized in some sense to the circumstances of their application (does 
waterboarding constitute torture?, should racists statements be protected under the 
freedom of expression? etc.).31  Rather, the particular dimension of international 
human rights norms involves a recognition that precisely because of their universal 
character, that human rights law applies to (sometimes radically) different social, 
historical, ethnic, cultural, developmental, religious and political contexts.   For these 
reasons, Carozza argues that the very idea of universal human rights standards, entails 
an ‘affirmation of a degree of pluralism and diversity in [global] society’32  which 
‘recognises and protects our capacity to pursue the good […] by a plurality of 
paths.’33  The evolution of human rights regimes in the post-war era has, therefore, 
involved increased ‘norm specification’ 34  where ‘normative openness and 
underdetermination’35 characterise the terrain of international human rights law which 
results in a broad degree of ‘interpretative latitude’36 in the implementation of those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 N. Walker, ‘Universalism and Particularism in Human Rights’ in C. Holder & D. Reidy (eds.), 
Human Rights:  The Hard Questions (CUP, 2013), p. 42. 
32 P Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights law’ (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 38–79, 47. (hereinafter Carozza ‘Subsidiarity’) 
33 Carozza ‘Subsidiarity’, 47. 
34 Carozza ‘Subsidiarity’, 59. 
35 Carozza ‘Subsidiarity’, 60. 
36 Carozza ‘Subsidiarity’, 60. 
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norms.  The implementation, interpretation and application of human rights norms, 
then, involves ‘an exercise of creative freedom to legislate in different ways that may 
be equally consistent with the basic requirements of the common good.’37    Thus, 
even if the principles or values of human rights law are universal, their instantiation in 
particular legal orders can and do differ from context to context. Rather than 
constituting a ‘covering universalism’, then, human rights law can be said to be 
‘relatively’38  rather than absolutely determinate of ‘appropriate conduct in their 
domain of application’. 39   For Carozza, this interpretative discretion best 
characterises the development of international human rights law in the post-war era.40 
This particularistic dimension of human rights law has been central to the 
ECtHR’s interpretation and application of the rights contained in the ECHR.  From its 
earliest decisions, one common feature of the Court’s approach has been to stress the 
subsidiary nature of the Court’s protection of the rights contained in the Convention 
and the primary responsibility of signatory states to implement and give effect to the 
rights contained in the Convention.41 It is, the Court has repeatedly stressed, for states, 
in the first instance to implement and apply the rights of the convention according to 
their relevant domestic requirements.42   Two aspects of the Court’s practice reveal 
this particularistic dimension of human rights; the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
the lack of uniform implementation of the Convention in domestic law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Carozza ‘Subsidiarity’, 72. 
38 Neil Walker, ‘Universalism and particularism in human rights' , 43. 
39 Ibid. 
40 ‘[D]espite all of the normative developments of international human rights law over the last half 
century, it is still characterized less by fully articulated normative content than by the interpretative 
discretion that it leaves to states through the open-ended nature of its language, the legal doctrines 
supporting it, and the political context of the culturally pluralistic world to which it is intended to 
apply.’ Carozza ‘Subsidiarity’ 62. 
41 Sadik v. Greece, 24 EHRR (1996) 323, 399. 
42 Judgment of 23 July 1968 on the merits of the "Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 35, para. 
10 in fine. 
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The margin of appreciation doctrine where the Court defers under certain 
conditions to the domestic authorities’ appraisal of facts, decision-making procedures 
and interpretation of national law and mores, present from the Court’s earliest 
decisions, clearly demonstrate this necessarily particularistic dimension of human 
rights law.  For example, in an early seminar decision, Handyside v. UK.,43 the Court 
explicitly recognised that human rights could not be accommodated in precisely the 
same way in the different jurisdictions in Europe due to the pluralism which 
prevailed, even in a relatively homogenous region such as Western Europe, with 
regard to the meaning of public morals.44  It was therefore, the Court concluded, for 
national authorities and institutions to interpret and apply the relevant provisions of 
the convention in a manner best suited to their national sensibilities.45  This ‘margin 
of appreciation’46 applied, not only to judicial authorities but also to the ‘domestic 
legislator  and [other] bodies […]that are called upon to interpret and apply the laws 
in force’.47  
 Furthermore, notwithstanding the Court’s instance on the primary role of 
states in implementing and giving effect to the Convention, it has never insisted on 
how, precisely, the rights contained in the ECHR should be implemented in national 
law whether through formal incorporation, or the prescription of remedies for 
violation.  With regard to the question of formal incorporation, in its early cases the 
Court explicitly refused to interpret Art. 13 ECHR requiring national authorities to 
provide an ‘effective remedy’ for rights violations, as a general obligation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Handyside v. UK (5493/72) [1976] ECHR 5 (7 December 1976). 
44 Handyside v. UK (5493/72) [1976] ECHR 5 (7 December 1976). 
45 Handyside, para. 48. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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incorporate the convention into domestic law.48  Moreover, in respect of prescribing 
remedies for human rights violations under the Convention, the Court has maintained 
that it is not competent to make recommendations on how States should or could 
better comply with the Convention by prescribing institutional, administrative or legal 
reform.  It has generally limited itself to providing ‘just satisfaction’ for victims 
where national law failed to provide full reparation.49  
Thus, the notion that international human rights norms necessitate a degree of 
calibration and domestication into domestic legal systems and political contexts is a 
commonplace in international human rights law, particularly European human rights 
law. This being the case, then, the question then emerges for states with internally 
differentiated levels of government such as federal states or complex asymmetrically 
governed states such as the U.K, Spain or Belgium, as to what the appropriate level 
for this accommodation or ‘domestication’ is.  That there can be some variation in 
human rights standards even within a single state is not unusual. As the UK 
Parliament’s Joint Committee for Human Right’s Report on a Bill of Rights for the 
UK noted: 
  ‘It is common for federated states, such as Canada, the US and Germany, to 
have both federal Bills of rights and state-level Bills of Rights, and for any questions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See Silver v. UK, ECtHR, Series A No. 61 (1983), para. 113; Swedish Engine Driver’s Union v. 
Sweden, ECtHR, Series A No. 20 (1984), para. 50 
49 L. Hefler, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:  Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’ (2008) 19(1) EJIL 125-159, 146).  Admittedly, the 
Court has been more prescriptive in recent years, making recommendations to remedy systemic 
deficiencies in national law through the practice of ‘pilot judgements’ targeted at specific signatory 
states. ( See Broniowski v. Poland 2002-X; 40 EHRR 21) However, even here, such recommendations 
are made with the cooperation of, and in conjunction with, national authorities.  See generally, W. 
Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg:  Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot 
Judgments’ [2009] 9:3 Human Rights Law Review 397-453.. 
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about the hierarchical relationship between these different levels of rights protection 
to be resolved by the federation’s Constitutional Court.’ 50 
Furthermore, on the implementation of international human rights standards, 
the Committee noted in respect of internally differentiated states, that:  
‘Ever since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights norms 
have gradually become embedded at global, regional and national level.  Provided the 
hierarchy between these levels is clear, there is a positive virtue in the broadly defined 
rights in the international standards being fleshed out into more concrete norms and 
standards at the regional, national and sub-national level.’  
Thus, the notion that different levels of government within a single state may 
have distinct human rights jurisdiction is an unremarkable feature of many internally 
differentiated states.  However, as the opinion of the committee for a Bill of Rights 
notes, such sub-national jurisdictions remain subject to their ‘correction’ by the 
national or metropolitan level thereby ensuring uniformity of standards across the 
various levels of government within the state itself, just as the UKSC appeared to do 
in Cadder and Frazer. 51  However, the notion of the autonomy of subnational 
minorities in implementing and applying international human rights norms implicit in 
the comments from the First Minister and the Justice Secretary, goes beyond this.  
They call for the explicit recognition and respect by metropolitan apex courts of the 
subnational minority’s choices on how to implement and protect human rights norms 
within their particular systems.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 A Bill of Rights for the UK? (2007-8) HL 165, HC 150, vol I, Ch. 3 Para. 107. 
51 I say ‘appeared’ because shortly before Cadder was decided, the UKSC decided a case involving 
English and Welsh criminal law where it defied Strasbourg and upheld the practices of English and 
Welsh criminal procedure notwithstanding the fact that according to the Strasbourg Court, such 
practices were in breach of Art. 6 ECHR.  (R v. Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14).  Thus, it is not entirely 
clear, in the light of this decision, whether the UKSC is, in fact, maintaining a uniform ECHR 
compatible standard of human rights protection across the UK or whether the biggest criminal 
jurisdiction in the state, England and Wales, has more autonomy than Scotland or Northern Ireland to 
diverge from the ECtHR’s rulings. 
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Thus the fact of internal differentiation alone does not necessarily lead to the 
respect and recognition of sub-state autonomy in interpreting and applying 
international human rights norms such as the HCJ’s opinions on the meaning and 
requirements of a right to a fair trial in questions of access to legal advice and the 
withholding of particular evidence forming the basis of the appeals in Cadder and 
Frazer.  Rather, an independent normative argument is required to substantiate the 
positions taken by the Justice Secretary and First Minister.  Such normative reasons 
can be found, it is submitted by drawing on a liberal theory of minority rights and the 
theory of constitutional patriotism.  
Normativizing the autonomy of national minorities in the implementation of 
human rights 
Kymlicka’s well-known liberal theory of national minorities provides one 
resource to provide normative arguments as to why national apex courts should 
recognise and respect the autonomy of national minorities in domesticating 
international human rights standards.  It departs from the notion of a ‘societal culture’ 
which can be differentiated from other types of group cultures such as religious or 
social groups in that it provides its members ‘with meaningful ways of life across the 
full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, 
and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres’.52 As such societal 
cultures ‘are important to people’s freedom’53 where such freedom involves ‘making 
choices amongst various options’54 determining the ‘boundaries of the imaginable.’55 
The societal culture ‘not only provides these options’56 but also, significantly, ‘makes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship:  A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (OUP: 1996), 76. 
(hereinafter ‘Multicultural Citizenship’). 
53 Multicultural Citizenship, 80. 
54 Multicultural Citizenship 89. 
55 Multicultural Citizenship 89. 
56 Multicultural Citizenship 83. 
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them meaningful to us.’57  As such, culture ‘provides the receptacle through which we 
identify our experiences as valuable’58 where cultural narratives are a ‘precondition of 
making intelligent judgments about how to lead our lives.’59  Significantly for 
Kymlicka, societal cultures are usually territorially based and share not just language, 
memories and values but also ‘common institutions and practices.’60 
Combining the fact that human rights norms require some domestic 
accommodation with the freedom of ‘cultural societies’, it is argued, can provide 
normative support for the autonomy of national minorities in the implementation and 
application of human rights norms which can create demands for recognition of this 
autonomy by the metropole.  If, as Kymlicka suggests, a societal culture provides 
options across the ‘full range of human activities’ then this necessarily involves and 
includes questions about the freedom to choose different paths to the good life which 
human rights norms, and the diversity in their accommodation, necessarily 
presupposes.  In this respect, the ‘meaningful options’61 about questions of freedom 
and how to live one’s life dovetail with Carozza’s assertion that the international 
human rights system entails the ‘creative freedom’62 to domesticate the abstract and 
open-textured values in different ways which are consistent with the ‘basic 
requirements of the common good.’63  As such the freedom of cultural societies can 
be said to involve the ‘freedom of individuals and communities to seek the goods 
necessary for a dignified human life’64 implicit in the idea of international human 
rights law.  If the latitude to implement and apply human rights norms really is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Multicultural Citizenship 83. 
58 Dworkin cited by Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 83. 
59 Multicultural Citizenship, 83. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Multicultural Citizenship, 83. 
62 Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity’ 72. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity' , 47. 
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function of the value of liberty as Carozza suggests, and this is an endemic feature of 
international human rights law in the post-war period, then viewed from the 
perspective of the freedom of cultural societies, it could be argued that contemporary 
international human rights law requires a measure of autonomy and respect from the 
metropole in domesticating human rights norms within that particular societal culture.  
Furthermore, the domestication of universal human rights norms within a 
particular societal culture, and the freedom, identity and self-determination of that 
culture can be mutually constitutive, as suggested by the idea of constitutional 
patriotism. Müller defines constitutional patriotism as providing ‘one possible 
language for an exercise in collective ethical self-clarification’,65 involving ‘bounded 
political associations’66 who have ‘an attachment to universal values, which is then 
realised in a particular political setting.’67  
Significantly, the object of attachment in constitutional patriotism relates to the 
‘universal moral norms’68 embedded in  ‘particular procedures that structure the rules 
for reworking a constitutional culture.’69  It is from disagreements about what these 
universal moral norms require within particular contexts that a ‘constitutional 
identity’ or ‘constitutional culture’ emerges.70  In this regard, Müller recalls the 
Habermassian distinction between the ethical and the moral realm, whereby in the 
ethical realm collectives ‘reach an understanding of who they would like to be and 
which of their traditions they should continue or modify in the light of moral 
discourses’71 and the realm of morality aims at ‘finding rules and decisions that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 J.-W. Müller, ‘A general theory of constitutional patriotism’ (2008) 6 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 72–95, 77. (hereinafter  Müller ‘General theory’) 
66 Ibid, 78.  
67 Müller, ‘General Theory’ , 73. 
68 Müller, ‘General Theory’, 82. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Müller, ‘General Theory’ , 80. 
71 Müller, ‘General Theory’ 83. 
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rationally acceptable to all affected by the rules.’72  However, in practice given that 
‘questions about universal rights and collective identities cannot easily be 
disentangled in practical political debate’73, the boundaries between the ethical and 
the moral realms can be collapsed such that the act of self-definition becomes part and 
parcel of finding rules and decisions that are universally morally acceptable. Viewed 
in this light, then, the question of the ethical-clarification of political communities, in 
negotiating and disagreeing about the meaning and requirements of universal morality 
within particular cultural contexts overlaps considerably with the ‘domestication’ of 
international human rights norms in national minority contexts considered above.  In 
negotiating and determining what universal norms such as the right to a fair trial or 
freedom of expression require in the context of a particular societal culture, the 
political and constitutional identity of that particular societal culture can be said to be 
given further definition along constitutional patriotic lines.  Thus, as well as providing 
reasons for the autonomy of societal cultures in implementing human rights norms, 
constitutional patriotism shows how the very act of accommodating and 
domesticating international human rights norms by national minorities underpins and 
constitutes an expression of the identity of that societal culture qua political 
community. Given the link between the accommodation of human rights norms and 
cultural freedom, then, it can be seen how the autonomy of national minorities in 
accommodating and giving expression to human rights norms can, in itself, constitute 
a form of constitutional patriotism.74  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Müller, ‘General Theory’, 83. 
73 Müller, ‘General Theory’  84. 
74 Using Müller’s account of Constitutional Patriotism in this way, constitutes a departure from the 
contexts within which Müller himself envisages that constitutional patriotism can apply.  He is clear 
that constitutional patriotism cannot provide leverage for the formation of political communities in the 
form of, for example, the independence of extant substate national minorities.  Constitutional 
Patriotism is not, therefore, a ‘freestanding theory of political boundary formation’ (5) and as such 
cannot ‘answer questions about political self-determination’(5) for potential political communities that 
do not already enjoy constitutional and institutional infrastructures.  However, this objection can be 
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4. Methods of Management 
The practice of International Human Rights law contains a number of resources 
that can potentially give expression to the normative argument for the autonomy of 
national minorities in the application of international human rights norms.  Three 
aspects of the contemporary practice of international human rights in particular can 
potentially serve this purpose; human rights exceptionalism, subsidiarity and 
pluralism.  
 
1) Human Rights Exceptionalism 
 
Human Rights exceptionalism is a political or judicial attitude to international human 
rights law genetically linked to ideas of sovereignty and self-determination.  Writing 
in the US context, Ignatieff identifies three forms of human rights exceptionalism; the 
non-ratification of human rights treaties, the insertion of reservations to treaties or 
non-compliance with ratified treaties; double-standards in criticizing friends and 
enemies for human rights violations in foreign policy; and denying human rights 
norms any effect in domestic law.75 Given that a large part of the explanation of US 
exceptionalism with respect to international human rights standards has to do with its 
sheer size and economic and political influence as the world’s only ‘hyperpower’76, of 
the three dimensions of exceptionalism identified by Ignatieff, it is the third form, 
denying international human rights norms effect in domestic law, which is of 
relevance to the question of the autonomy of national minorities in relation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overcome, it is submitted, by founding the constitutional patriotism of subnational minorities on the 
freedom of existing national minorities which can do the relevant, and necessary work, to delimit or 
define the boundaries of subnational minorities qua political communities in order for constitutional 
patriotism to apply. 
75 M. Ignatieff, ‘Introduction:  American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’ in M. Ignatieff (ed.), 
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005),  6-8. 
76 Ignatieff, 12. 
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universal human rights standards.  This form of human rights exceptionalism involves 
subnational minority courts taking an ‘exceptional’ attitude to international human 
rights law by refusing to recognise them as valid law, refusing to apply them, 
subordinating them to overriding provisions of domestic law or interpreting them in 
such a way as to deny them any real effect.  The public face of this form of 
exceptionalism in the US is Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court,77 
however Scotland also has a figurehead for human rights exceptionalism in the figure 
of Lord McCluskey, a former judge of the Scottish Supreme Courts.  In the face of 
rising demands for the domestic implementation of the ECHR in the UK, McCluskey 
used the occasion of the delivery of the BBC’s Reith Lectures in 1986 to denounce 
the idea of universal human rights standards and their codification in Scotland, 
famously predicting that domestic incorporation of the ECHR would be ‘a field day 
for crackpots, a pain in the neck for judges and legislators, and a goldmine for 
lawyers.’78 He reprised these remarks in a series of Articles in Scottish newspapers in 
2000 shortly after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in Scotland arguing 
that the immediate effect of litigants ‘claiming their new ‘European’ rights’79 had 
been ‘devastating’80. He also denounced the fact that the ECtHR contained judges 
from foreign countries who would be adjudicating on Scottish matters.  This series of 
comments led to his being recused from a criminal trial in which the defendants had 
based part of their defence on ECHR provisions in the case of Hoekstra v. HMA (No. 
1).81  On appeal, the defendants argued that McCluskey’s extra-curial remarks meant 
that the trial was tainted by bias given that they were pleading provisions of the HRA 
as part of their defence.  In a hearing on whether the bench should be reconfigured for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Printz v. US 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. 11 (1997). 
78 Published as McCluskey, Law, Justice and Democracy, (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 1987). 
79 Ibid. 
80 Scotland on Sunday, 6 February 2000. 
81 2000 S.C.C.R. 263. 
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the continuation of the case, the HCJ agreed and ordered a rehearing of the parts of 
the trial.   The exceptionalist nature of McCluskey’s position on the role of 
international human rights norms in Scottish courts was well summarized by the 
Court during this hearing and it is therefore worth quoting at length.  They noted 
that:82 
‘by likening the introduction of the Convention into Scots law to the introduction of a 
Trojan Horse, in the shape of a revolutionary instrument for change, Lord McCluskey 
was conjuring up the picture of a deceitful stratagem being used to introduce into the 
citadel of Scots law an alien force which would attack the defending soldiers. There 
was an implicit suggestion that this alien force would be introducing a revolution 
which would change the established and better ways of the native Scots law. The 
immediate results of the introduction of the Convention in Scotland had been 
“devastating”—implying that it had laid waste areas of national law. Whether one 
thought of the Titanic sailing towards a legal iceberg or the approach of an avalanche 
in which the Scottish courts would have to struggle to avoid being buried in the new 
claims of right, the imagery was overwhelmingly negative and painted a picture of the 
Convention as something which threatened danger to the Scottish legal system.” 
Thus, human rights exceptionalism has taken root in Scotland and could provide 
a possible basis for the autonomy of national minorities in implementing international 
human rights norms.  However, even if this is the case it is not a particularly attractive 
way of doing so.  As a political or judicial attitude, rather than legal doctrine of 
international human rights law, exceptionalism is unsuited to managing the 
domestication of international human rights standards at national minority level.  
Rather than good faith engagement with the international human rights standards as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Hoekstra v. H. M. Advocate (No. 3), 2000 SLT 605, [2000] H.R.L.R. 410. 
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part of the on-going constitution of the political identity of national minorities, human 
rights exceptionalism constitutes a rejection or subordination of human rights 
standards to a domestic constitutional chauvinism more relevant to the darker legacies 
of nationalism than the normative freedom of cultural societies.  As such, it does not 
achieve the ideals of the normative theory outlined above whereby national minorities 
engage with and take seriously the universal standards set by international human 
rights norms. 
 
2) Subsidiarity 
 
Subsidiarity is becoming an increasingly prominent feature of the international human 
rights landscape. 83  The concept itself, has, in recent times, found its clearest 
expression in the EU context but has since spread to other mechanisms and 
institutions of suprastate governance.84  At its root, subsidiarity provides a ‘conceptual 
and rhetorical mediator between supranational harmonisation and unity, on the one 
hand, and local pluralism and difference on the other.’85 The kernel of the idea of 
subsidiarity, then is the idea that in a distribution of levels of decision-making, 
decisions should be taken as close as possible to the individual within a particular 
social context.  
Neumann identifies four features of the structure of international human rights 
law which encapsulates the ideals of subsidiarity in terms of the appropriate level of 
decision-making; the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement, the ‘fourth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 For example, Protocol 15 to the ECHR of the 24 September 2013  makes an explicit reference to the 
concept to be inserted in one of the recitals of the Preamble of Convention itself on ratification.   
84 See generally Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity’. 
85 Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity’,  54. 
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instance’ formula, remedial subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation.86  The 
exhaustion of domestic remedies is perhaps the clearest expression of subsidiarity in 
international human rights law in its insistence that states are the principal site of 
resolution of complaints of human rights violations and has become a standard 
procedural mechanism for many suprastate adjudicatory bodies. 87   The ‘fourth 
instance’ doctrine relates to the idea that suprastate courts, not least Human rights 
adjudicatory bodies, should not act as a forum of fourth instance on a particular 
dispute; their proper role is simply to assess whether the claimed action violates the 
particular human rights standards established in the international agreement signed by 
the relevant state.88  Remedial subsidiarity relates to the notion that it is for states, and 
states alone to determine what the appropriate remedy for a human rights violation is 
and the margin of appreciation, discussed above in relation to the ECHR, relates to 
supranational courts deference under certain conditions to the domestic authorities’ 
appraisal of facts, decision-making procedures and interpretation of national law and 
mores.89   
 With its arguably overtly political or at least principled character, it would 
appear that subsidiarity would be a particularly useful mechanism to manage the 
tension between universality and particularity in respect of human rights adjudication 
by national minorities.  Its emphasis on taking decisions about the nature, meaning 
and implementation of human rights norms as close as possible to the individual in 
their most relevant social context90 resonates strongly with the ideals of the liberty of 
cultural societies.   However, two features of subsidiarity in international human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 G. Neman, ‘Subsidiarity’ in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights 
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rights law both conceptually and in practice create doubts as to whether it is suitable 
to vindicate the interpretative autonomy of national minorities in implementing 
international human rights norms.  Firstly, the aims of subsidiarity as it has emerged 
both in catholic social doctrine as well as in political theory relate to social groupings 
such as trades unions, community groups or religions organisations rather the 
Kymlickan notion of ‘cultural society’.  As much is clear from Neuman’s 
identification of certain international human rights norms as encapsulating the ideals 
of subsidiarity such as the right to freedom of association and the right to family 
life.91  However, as noted above, cultural societies differ from generic social groups in 
providing their members with meaningful ways of life across the ‘full range of human 
activities’92 crystallizing in common institutions and practices and not mere interest-
based social association.  Secondly, whereas in theory subsidiarity appears to be an 
optimal way of managing the tension between human rights universality and the 
specificity of national minorities, in international human rights law practice it has 
tended to rely on a rigid understanding of the ‘westphalian paradigm’ of sovereign 
states.  As such, subsidiarity stops at the state level and serves merely to adjudicate 
and operate between two levels, national and international, oblivious to the question 
of whether national minorities should have a stake in the implementation of human 
rights norms.  As Neumann notes in this regard:93  
‘ … international human rights law does not currently provide strong support for a 
requirement of territorial subsidiarity within the state, as a claim for federalism or 
local government … The principal human rights treaties do not given local 
governments autonomy rights against regions or states, or require that the larger 
unites refrain from regulating matters that the local governments could address. ‘ 	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92 'Multicultural Citizenship',  76. 
93 Neumann, ‘Subsidiarity’, 368, Emphasis Added. 
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 While a step in the right direction, then, subsidiarity provides cold comfort for 
national minorities with aspirations of implementing and contextualizing international 
human rights norms according to their own cultural orientation as a facet of their own 
freedom as a cultural society.  However, building on the ideals of subsidiarity, a more 
recent trend in human rights law is, it is claimed, up to the task and can provide a 
more appropriate vehicle for the vindication of national minority autonomy in the 
domestic accommodation of international human rights standards; that is the idea of 
pluralism.   
3) Pluralism. 
 
 The field of legal and constitutional pluralism in respect of the interaction and 
conflicts between legal orders in the contemporary world is an increasingly broad 
field with diverse interests and normative commitments.94  Notwithstanding such 
diversity, however a number of features can be distilled from the increasingly diverse 
models and defences of pluralism advanced in academic scholarship on the subject. 
Perhaps the most significant feature shared by all pluralists, which is of particular 
relevance to the question being considered here, is the sense in which the 
‘Westphalian paradigm’ of territorial state sovereignty and an international system of 
sovereign states who design the international legal system according to their own ends 
is, if not quite redundant, certainly being increasingly challenged by the forces of 
globalization and the proliferation of suprastate legal orders with executive, judicial 
and legislative functions with concomitant claims to autonomy and original 
jurisdiction.  The fortification of suprastate law and governance such that 
International law is becoming increasingly constitution-like and constitutional law 
increasingly imports elements of international law constitutes a particular challenge to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 A literature which is increasing exponentially.  For a recent collection on the current state of the 
debate see M. Avbelj & J. Komarek, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 
(Hart, 2012). 
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understanding the legal and political world in terms of a rigid state sovereignty and a 
dualism of international and constitutional law.  Thus, one feature of pluralism in the 
diverse models and accounts of the idea is that we are in transition to (or have arrived 
at) a post-Westphalian settlement where state sovereignty is either obsolete as the 
founder of pluralism, Neil MacCormick argued,95 or in a state of evolution to a more 
complex form.96  Furthermore, pluralism recognises and embraces the considerable 
blurring of the constitutional and the international and sees the legal and political 
world in terms of a series of overlapping authorities and sites of governance which 
operate alongside each other in a heterarchy or polyarchy rather than hierarchy, at 
times cooperating but also conflicting in a global ‘disorder of legal orders’.97 
 Thus, pluralism is predicated upon a move away from, or evolution of, the 
rigid Westphalian dichotomy or dualism of international law and constitutional law 
and envisages authority claims not only from states but other sites at different levels 
of governance.  Given its rejection of a rigid dualism of the Westphalian model, as 
well as its demotion of state sovereignty as the primary organizing principle of law 
and politics, pluralism is therefore particularly apt to recognise and accommodate the 
idea of subnational minority adjudication of international human rights standards.98  
As well as highlighting the significance of suprastate governance in the contemporary 
world, pluralism has the capacity to prize open the lid of the sovereign state and 
assimilate the complexity and differentiated nature of sub-state governance and 
authority claims, encapsulating them into a broader tapestry of overlapping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 N. MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56(1) MLR 1-18. 
96 N. Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in N. Walker, Sovereignty in Transition, (Hart: 
2003). 
97 N. Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids:  Mapping the Global Disorder of 
normative Orders’ (2008) 6(3-4) ICON 373-396. 
98 See generally C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Late Sovereignty in Post-Integration Europe:  Continuity and 
Change in a Constitutive Concept’ in R. Adler-Nissen & U. Pram-Grad, Post-Colonial Sovereignty 
Games: The Overseas Countries and Territories of the European Union, (Routledge 2012). 
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heterarchial or polyarchical authority claims at substate, state and suprastate levels.99  
Furthermore, the emphasis in pluralism on dynamic discursive interaction rather than 
static assertions of final and absolute authority mean that subnational minorities can 
make plausible claims to autonomy without having to challenge or assert a 
Westphalian-style sovereignty in the form of independence.100  As such pluralism 
gives agency and voice to subnational minority claims, including at the post-state 
level in way which the Westphalian system does not.  
With respect to the ECHR in particular, pluralism has been used to support the 
authority claims of the ECtHR in interpreting the rights contained in the Convention, 
as well as the counter-authority claims from national apex courts.101   However, as 
distinct from other forms of regime interaction in a global ‘disorder of legal orders’, 
human rights law is particularly conducive to pluralism given that it entails a common 
set of universal values which provide a common point of reference for all 
interpretative levels whether at the sub-state, state and suprastate levels.   In this 
regard, the ‘suprapositive’102 values of the rights contained in the ECHR can provide 
a framework allowing for the ‘constructive engagement of different sites of authority 
with one another.’103  In this vein, the ECHR can be said to provide this framework,  
‘map[ing] onto rights found in national systems [and] undergird[ing] the notion of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 See N. Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71(2) MLR 183-
216, C. Sabel and O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising and Overlapping Consensus:  The ECJ and the 
Emergency of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16(5) ELJ 511-550, S. Greer and L. 
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103  M. Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism:  On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and Beyond the States’ in J. Dunoff and J. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World?:  
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multi-level constitutionalism’104 whereby ‘no act taken by any public authority, at any 
level of governance, can be considered lawful if it violates a fundamental right.’105  
Pluralism, therefore, encapsulates the contestation and disagreement about the 
meaning and interpretation of these common values as well as the optimal way to 
secure their protection in diverse political and social environments and at different 
levels of governance in a post-Westphalian Europe.   
Thus, when interpreting the rights contained in the Convention, which are shared 
by the various legal systems, sub-national courts, national courts and the ECtHR can 
delve into the same common normative resource of universal values which inform the 
(positive) provisions of the ECHR.  These principles therefore provide the ‘glue’106 
which binds sub-national and national legal orders and the ECtHR system together in 
a pluralist relationship over and above the positive law provisions of subnational or 
national constitutional arrangements or the Convention itself.107 In terms of the 
autonomy of national minorities in the implementation of international human rights 
standards, then, pluralism is the most suitable feature of contemporary international 
human rights law theory and practice to express this ideal. 
 
5.  Conclusion. 
This contribution attempted to explore arguments in favour of the autonomy of 
national minorities in adjudicating and implementing universal human rights 
standards as well as appraise some of the extant conceptual and doctrinal tools of 
international human rights law to achieve those aims.  It concludes that there are valid 	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(2011) 24 Ratio Juris 369–385, 378. 
107 Such as the explicit terms of the Scotland Act 1998 or Articles 32 and 46 ECHR on the jurisdiction 
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normative arguments for national minorities having some say in how universal human 
rights norms are ‘domesticated’ within their particular cultural and historical contexts 
distinct from the dominant culture of the metropole.  Moreover, the tools of pluralism 
which is an increasingly popular trend in human rights law, is a particularly useful 
way of thinking about how that ideal might be achieved.  If authority sites have been 
pluralised in a post-Westphalian world, whereby not only states can enjoy agency and 
authority as political and judicial actors, and in the human rights domain, such agency 
is contained within a common framework of fundamental rights values, then there is 
no conceptual barrier to national minorities participating in dialogues regarding the 
interpretation and implementation of universal human rights norms alongside both the 
metropolitan and suprastate levels.  Furthermore, if fundamental rights claims 
involve, at least in part, the shaping of political identity, then a liberal theory of 
national minorities along with their constitutional patriotism, provides strong 
normative reasons for the role of national minority (particularly judicial) institutions 
in engaging and participating in the joint enterprise of ‘promoting a joint European 
development of fundamental rights’108 in a pluralistic relationship with the state and 
suprastate level all captured within the framework of the values and principles which 
underpin the ECHR.  The shared ‘glue’ of fundamental rights, combined with the 
evolution of the Westphalian paradigm to allow for unorthodox (from a Westphalian 
viewpoint) authority claims from unorthodox authority sites, therefore, allows for 
subnational minority institutions to engage and partake in the on-going articulation, 
definition and adjudication of the meaning of the common normative resources of 
human rights principles, adapted and tailored to the requirements of their own 
national minority status, thereby (re)defining their political identities.  	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Whereas the political incident which provided the catalyst for this exploration 
may have been motivated by more strategic or party political reasons, what this 
chapter has argued is that one need not be completely cynical of the contentions of the 
Justice Secretary and First Minister and respond so quickly to the Lord Advocate’s 
question in the affirmative.  As a subnational minority jurisdiction, Scotland is 
justified in not sharing the same understanding of the meaning and requirements of 
human rights norms as their co-citizens in the rest of the United Kingdom; its children 
may lisp a particularly Scottish interpretation of the rights of man.   
